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THE WONDERFUL WORLD OF PATENTS: “THEY DO THINGS DIFFERENTLY THERE”
– David Vaver∗ 
THE SCENE: The patent infringement trial of Ewon v Fowler held on Zoom in the Federal Court of
Canada, after the decision of the Federal Court of Appeal in CanMar Foods Ltd v TA Foods Ltd, 2021
FCA 7. That decision affirmed a judgment of Manson J, 2019 FC 1233, finding no infringement of the
patent in that case but holding, contrary to the judge, that a communication in a proceeding before
the US Patent Office could not be used to help reach that conclusion. The Court of Appeal said that
section 53.1 of the Patent Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-4, which reversed Free World Trust v. Électro Santé
Inc., 2000 SCC 66, made only communications with the Canadian Patent Office admissible in evidence.
DRAMATIS PERSONAE: Justice R. Bitter, judge (J)
Sue N. Ewon, plaintiff (P)
Wigmore Cross, plaintiff’s counsel (PC)
Chick Fowler, defendant (D)
Ms Chiff Maker, defendant’s counsel (DC)
PARTIAL TRANSCRIPT OF CROSS-EXAMINATION OF PLAINTIFF SUE N. EWON:
DC: So, Ms Ewon, you say the defendant’s chicken-plucker infringes claim 1 of your patent?
P: Yes.
DC: Because it includes chicken-pluckers with a widget, and the defendant’s plucker has that widget?
P: Yes.
DC: Did you ever tell anyone that claim 1 doesn’t include chicken-pluckers with a widget?
PC: I object, what plaintiff thinks her claim means is irrelevant. That’s for the judge.
J: Yes, I think that’s right. Ms Maker, I decide questions of law.
DC: All right. (To P:) When you applied for your Canadian patent, did your patent agent write to the
examiner to say that pluckers with widgets were excluded?
P: I’ve no idea.
DC: I show you Exhibit K. You recognize that letter from your patent agent to the examiner?
P: Yes, she sent me a copy.
DC: You see where it says “Enclosed is a new claim 1 that corresponds substantially to the claim
submitted in prosecution of the related United States patent application”?
P: Yes.
DC: You did have such an application in the United States, didn’t you?
∗ Professor of Intellectual Property Law, Osgoode Hall Law School; Emeritus Professor of Intellectual Property
& Information Technology Law, University of Oxford. This is an abridged version of a Comment that will 
appear in the Intellectual Property Journal.
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PC (to J): With respect, Your Ladyship, I have no idea where this is all heading.
J: Nor do I, but I’ll cut Ms Maker some slack for the moment.
DC: Thank you. (To P:) I repeat, you did have an application filed in the United States for the same 
invention as in this case, didn’t you?
J: Yes.
DC: Are you aware that the attorney handling your American application wrote to the American
examiner, saying that a new claim 1 he was submitting would overcome the examiner’s objection that 
chicken-pluckers with widgets were known to the prior art?
PC (to J): I object most strenuously to that whole question. Even if my client personally wrote to the
American examiner saying that, it is inadmissible here.
J: Why? Because it wasn’t said in Canada to a Canadian examiner?
PC: Yes.
J: Would it have been admissible had your client written the same thing to the Canadian examiner?
PC: I don’t believe anything said anywhere else than in a Canadian prosecution has anything to do
with this case. May I draw Your Ladyship’s attention to the Court of Appeal’s reasons in CanMar at
paragraph 70? The Court there said you should be “wary” about allowing anything other than 
Canadian prosecution history in. And then at paragraph 71 the Court went on to say you should “tread
carefully” in admitting extrinsic evidence to interpret a patent claim. And once again in that
paragraph, “Opening the door to allowing foreign patent prosecution history into the analysis might
lead to overly contentious and expensive litigation.”
J: Well, I am treading carefully and warily, and I haven’t turned the door knob yet. Hasn’t this litigation
been contentious and expensive enough anyway? Aren’t you making it more expensive and
contentious by raising these sorts of objections? I can’t see why a statement that would be admissible
and relevant if made in Gatineau becomes inadmissible and irrelevant if made in Alexandria. What
happens in Virginia doesn’t have to stay in Virginia.
PC: With respect, it is not Your Ladyship’s role to question the wisdom of Parliament. Both Justice
Manson and the Court of Appeal said very clearly that section 53.1 applies only to communications
to the Canadian Patent Office.
J: I am not questioning Parliament’s wisdom, only the awkward statutory language used to translate
it. Hasn’t one of my colleagues just decided that even Canadian history isn’t admissible if it’s the
licensor rather than the patentee who sues, even where the patentee is a defendant (Allergan Inc v
Sandoz Canada Inc, 2020 FC 1189 at [126])? Why couldn’t section 53.1 just have said that any
prosecution history from wherever is admissible but its weight is for the court? Is section 53.1 based
on any other country’s legislation?
PC: Not that I know, Your Ladyship. It is homegrown, although I accept there may be a few weeds
among the roses.
J: What I am saying, I guess, is much what Justice Manson said in CanMar. Here we have the
extraordinary circumstance that the Canadian communication expressly refers to the corresponding
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US application and the clear inference is that the Canadian claim is being replaced precisely to
overcome the actual or anticipated citation of the same prior art against the Canadian application.
PC: With respect, that is exactly the same situation as in CanMar, and the Court of Appeal explicitly
overruled Justice Manson’s admission of the American file.
J: We have this anomaly then, haven’t we? If the Canadian patent had been granted unchanged and
without reference to the US application, your client could have asked for it to be reissued with the
changed claim under section 47 of the Patent Act because of an inadvertent mistake. Foreign
prosecution history has long been admitted on a reissue application to show there was a mistake and
that the reissued patent would be for the same invention. Why allow the foreign file to be admitted
to show the reissue was justified, but exclude it to show what the claims now mean?
PC: If that was the position before section 53.1 took effect, then I submit that such foreign history can
no longer be admitted in reissue.
J: What do you say, Ms Maker?
DC: Section 53.1 states that it specifically applies to reissue and no intent to change current Patent
Office practice appears. Nor is there any apparent attempt to overrule long-standing cases such as 
Northern Electric Co v Photo Sound Corp, [1936] SCR 649, where the whole case depended on foreign
prosecution history. If foreign history is admissible in reissue to determine the scope of the invention,
as I submit it was before and is after s. 53.1, then I cannot see why it is inadmissible where an ordinary
patent is involved.
J: Well, it’s a brave trial judge who says the Court of Appeal has decided something per incuriam and
should not be followed.
DC: May I make one further point? The Court of Appeal in CanMar relied on a decision of the United
States Federal Circuit Court of Appeals to say that the reference in the plaintiff’s letter to the Canadian
examiner to “a related United States patent application” wasn’t specific enough to incorporate the
corresponding US file. The point on how specific a cross-reference must be to allow another
document to be read has not been decided by the US Supreme Court, and I would point out that the
Federal Circuit Court of Appeals is a court with one of the highest reversal rates before the US 
Supreme Court, and especially so in patent cases.
What our Court of Appeal should have done was to apply the general law in Canada on when 
documents can be looked at together. Cases on the Statute of Frauds are the most obvious source. The
Statute requires contracts such as guarantees or sales of land to be evidenced by a memorandum in
writing, and ever since the 19th century it has been held that two or more documents can form a 
single memorandum. Supreme Court of Canada authority going back a century says, and I quote,
“parol evidence may be given to connect two documents together which do not expressly refer to
each other, but which connection and reference is a matter of fair and reasonable inference:” Doran
v McKinnon, 1916 CanLII 627 (SCC), 53 SCR 609 at 611. I can say that is also the law in most
Commonwealth countries and state courts of the United States. Not to put too fine a point on it, the
US Federal Circuit has gone rogue by making up its own rule of incorporation and ignoring the
general law of the majority of state courts.
I submit that in our case the reference to the US application is plain enough in the letter to the
Canadian examiner. It is also distinguishable from CanMar in two respects. First, our letter refers to
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“the” US application, whereas the Canmar letter referred only to “a” related application. We are very
specific. Second, the US application in CanMar was abandoned, whereas here the plaintiff’s
application specifically claims priority from the corresponding US application which was granted. It
is open to the Court to hold the US history admissible on either of these distinctions, since the Court
of Appeal specifically refused to express any “firm view on the broader issue of whether foreign
prosecution history can be considered under section 53.1.” I ask for Your Ladyship’s firm views now.
PC: I submit this case is covered exactly by the Court of Appeal in CanMar and the foreign history
cannot be looked at.
D (intervening): You mean Sue can lie to a Canadian judge where she wouldn’t dare to an American
one? [Scuffle breaks out.]
J: Ms Maker, could you kindly restrain your client? [Order resumes.] 
Thank you, counsel.
I propose to admit the statement in the US patent file into evidence. I shall not at this stage indicate
what weight it deserves or what use I may make of it. This case is not covered by CanMar because the
Canadian patent here relies for its priority on a stated US patent. The plaintiff cannot blow hot and
cold by then dismissing the very patent from which it claims priority and on which it may well depend
for validity in Canada.
The Court of Appeal thought it “a stretch” to incorporate a US patent file on language as general as
that which points to “a” related United States application. There is no “stretch” at all here since, as
defendant’s counsel submitted, the letter to the Canadian examiner points to “the” related US
application, not merely “a” related one. I nevertheless must say that, at a time when we are all urged
not to subject patents to “the kind of meticulous verbal analysis in which lawyers are too often
tempted by their training to indulge” (Catnic Components Ltd v Hill & Smith Ltd, [1982] RPC 183, 243 
(HL)), I would be reluctant to have to read the documents leading to the grant of a patent more
meticulously than I would read the patent itself.
I am also not sure that incorporation is the mot juste for the ability to follow a signpost and explore
the destination to which it points. There is no difficulty in identifying that destination off the face of
the Canadian file. Canadian patent law is no Alsatia where the general law stops, nor is it one where
the US Federal Circuit’s writ runs. To adapt L.P. Hartley’ s words in The Go-Between, patent law should
not be a different country where they do things differently. Law under the Statute of Frauds lets two 
documents be read together where their “connection and reference is a matter of fair and reasonable
inference:” Doran v McKinnon, 1916 CanLII 627 (SCC), 53 S.C.R. 609, 611, which I note was recently
applied to a series of emails in Druet v Girouard, 2012 NBCA 40 at [34]. Canadian patent law should
let patent files be cross-referenced that way too. The location of the second file should not matter,
any more than it does under the Statute of Frauds. If a multimillion dollar guarantee or land contract
can be interpreted and enforced by means of such a connection, so should a patent.
None of the parade of horribles trotted out by the Court of Appeal (CanMar at [71]) is present here.
There is no translation problem with the US file, and the Court of Appeal specifically said at [72] that 
“one should not underplay the public interest in keeping those who have previously disclaimed
elements from their patent from re-claiming them in future infringement cases.” I do not expect that
the plaintiff will ask me to take such a course, which Locke J (now JA) in Pollard Banknote Ltd v BABN
Technologies Corp, 2016 FC 883 at [237] described as “breathtaking.”
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I would only add in passing that, when the Court of Appeal comes to take a “firm view” on foreign 
prosecution history and section 53.1, it may well have to take account of the long-standing practice,
sanctioned by consistent Supreme Court authority, of relying on evidence of such history to decide
when the reissue of a defective or inoperative patent under section 47 of the Patent Act is warranted
or valid.
Ruling accordingly
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